On Two Squares of Opposition: the Leśniewski’s Style Formalization of Synthetic Propositions by Andrew Schumann
On Two Squares of Opposition: the Leśniewski’s Style
Formalization of Synthetic Propositions
Andrew Schumann
Received: 31 October 2011 /Accepted: 3 May 2012 /Published online: 15 July 2012
# The Author(s) 2012. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract In the paper we build up the ontology of Leśniewski’s type for formalizing
synthetic propositions. We claim that for these propositions an unconventional square
of opposition holds, where a, i are contrary, a, o (resp. e, i) are contradictory, e, o are
subcontrary, a, e (resp. i, o) are said to stand in the subalternation. Further, we
construct a non-Archimedean extension of Boolean algebra and show that in this
algebra just two squares of opposition are formalized: conventional and the square
that we invented. As a result, we can claim that there are only two basic squares of
opposition. All basic constructions of the paper (the new square of opposition, the
formalization of synthetic propositions within ontology of Leśniewski’s type, the
non-Archimedean explanation of square of opposition) are introduced for the first
time.
Keywords Synthetic propositions . Non-Archimedean extension of Boolean
algebra . Synthetic square of opposition . Synthetic ontology
1 Introduction
The square of opposition is one of the main concepts of traditional as well as classical
logic. For instance, it fixes the following fundamental relations in classical logic:
1) The duality relation between conjunction and disjunction p ^ qð Þ ) p _ qð Þð Þ ,
the law of non-contradiction p ^ :p  0ð Þ , the law of tertium non datur
p _ :p  1ð Þ :
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2) The duality relation between universal quantifier and existential quantifier
8xϕðxÞ ) 9xϕðxÞð Þ , the law of non-contradiction 8xϕðxÞ ^ 8x:ϕðxÞ½  ð
8x ϕðxÞ ^ :ϕðxÞð Þ½   0Þ , the law of tertium non datur for them 8xϕðxÞ_½ð





3) The duality relation between the modal operators of necessity and possibility, (□f
⇒ ◊f), the law of non-contradiction ([□f ∧ □¬f] ≡ 0), the law of tertium non datur
for them ([□f ∨ ◊¬f] ≡ 1 and [□¬f ∨ ◊f] ≡ 1):
As we see, the square of opposition is a key notion of different logics:
first-order logic, and modal logic. However, we claim in this paper that there
are two squares of opposition. One of the two is absolutely unknown still. It
is said to be the “lost” square of opposition. In the paper we prove its
existence.
First of all, let us show an informal meaning of the “lost” square of opposition. We
know that in genus–species relations we can consider a branch (a relation between a
genus and species) as implication, where the top of branch (genus) is regarded as
consequent of implication and the bottom of branch (species) as antecedent of
implication. Then for each node of the genera-species tree, we may define an
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intension as all reachable genera (all higher nodes) and an extent as all reachable
species (all lower nodes):
Definition 1 Let us take the set of all consequents of true implications, where the
name/proposition A is an antecedent. Then this set is an intension
(logical content) of A. For instance, let A be a human being. Then its
intension is built up by the set {‘rational,’ ‘animate,’ ‘social,’ etc.}.
Definition 2 Let us take the set of all antecedents of true implications, where the
name/proposition A is a consequent. Then this set is an extent (logical
scope) of A. For instance, let A be a human being. Then its extent is
built up by the set {‘worker,’ ‘woman,’ ‘scientist,’ etc.}.
Due to both definitions, we can precisely say what position in the genera–species
tree each node has:
Proposition 1 There exists the law of the inverse relation between intension and
extent: the greater intension is, the smaller extent is and, on the
contrary, the smaller intension is, the greater extent is.
This proposition is basic for the validity of the square of opposition taking into
account the following circumstances: ifA ⇒ B holds, 1) then A has the greater intension
than B and the smaller extent than the latter, 2) A and ¬B are contrary; 3) ¬A and B are
subcontrary, 4) A and ¬A (resp. B and ¬B) are contradictory. Hence, the conventional
square of opposition holds on semantic models where definitions 1 - 2 hold.
Nevertheless, there are propositions that do not satisfy the semantic model of
definitions 1 - 2. For instance, let us consider the following two propositions from the
Bible: ‘bestow that money for sheep’ and ‘bestow for whatsoever thy soul desireth’
(Deut. 14:26). Syntactically, ‘bestow for whatsoever thy soul desireth’ is a universal
affirmative proposition (SaP) and ‘bestow that money for sheep’ is a particular
affirmative proposition (SiP), i.e., the first is more general than the second.
However, for example, I do not desire sheep and I do not know people who desire
them. Perhaps such people exist, but I do not know. Then we cannot plot the classical
square, because ‘bestow that money for sheep’ is not included in ‘bestow for
whatsoever thy soul desireth,’ e.g., perhaps my soul does not desire sheep, but desires
many other things. The matter is that ‘thy soul desireth’ has different meaning in
different situations. This means that in this Biblical example the implication SaP ⇒
SiP is false in the general case. Thence we could assume another semantics (instead
of definitions 1 - 2), where SaP and SiP are different viewpoints of the same level.
Therefore, in one and the same situation of utterance, both statements (‘bestow for
whatsoever thy soul desireth,’ SaP , and ‘bestow that money for sheep’ SiP) may be
simultaneously false, but cannot be simultaneously true. In this way we obtain the
following unconventional square of opposition:
In order to explain this square, let us redefine logical content (intension):
Definition 3 Let us take the set of all members of true conjunctions, where the name/
proposition A occurs as well. Then this set is a non-well-founded
intension (non-well-founded logical content) of A. For instance, let A
be a human being. Then its non-well-founded intension is built up by the
set {‘with smooth skin,’ ‘animate,’ ‘featherless bipeds,’ etc.}.
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Proposition 2 Non-well-founded content (definition 3) includes the standard content
as particular case (definition 1).
Let us assume that an extent (logical scope) is defined in the
standard way (definition 2). Then the following proposition can be
readily proved:
Proposition 3 There exists the law of the direct relation between intension and
extent: the greater intension is, the greater extent is and the smaller
intension is, the smaller extent is.
From this proposition it follows that the duality that takes place
between the affirmation and the negation is formally explicated as
follows:
Proposition 4 Let us take two different propositions A, B containing the same verb
and satisfying definition 3. This means that there is a conjunction
A&B that is true or false (i.e., A and B have the same or different non-
well-founded content). Further, let us define the complement/nega-
tion ¬B satisfying definition 3 as well. Then in any case there is a
duality relation between A and ¬B.
Proof 1. A and B have the same non-well-founded content (A&B is true). Then ¬B ⇒
A, i.e. the extent of ¬B is smaller than A. 2. A and B have different non-well-founded
contents (A&B is false). Then A ⇒ ¬B, i.e., the extent of ¬B is greater than A. In both
cases we have a duality between A and ¬B.
Thus, if A ⇒ ¬B holds, 1) then A has the smaller intension than ¬B and the smaller
extent than the latter; 2) A and B are contrary; 3) ¬A and ¬B are subcontrary; 4) A and
¬A (resp. B and ¬B) are contradictory. As a result, we obtain the unconventional
square of opposition.
In the next sections we are formally proving that there exist two squares of
opposition and, correspondingly, two syllogistics within two ontologies of
Lesniewski’s type. In the first ontology the statement ‘S is P ’ is translated as S ⇒
P (as well as in proposition 1). In the second, the statement ‘S is P’ is translated as
S&P (as well as in proposition 4).
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2 Historical Background
The conventional square of opposition has been the best known logical pattern since
Aristotle. However, since Kant and Rickert many transcendental philosophers have
noted that this square does not satisfy synthetic propositions in the same measure as
analytic ones, and therefore they have postulated new informal/meaningful logics:
transcendental, dialectical, etc. In this paper we are proving that there are two squares
of opposition under following assumptions:
& We have the Boolean complement;
& Synthetic propositions cannot be reduced to manipulations with Venn diagrams,
because they do not suppose including relations.
Aristotle himself described relations of the square of opposition to represent
singular expressions (Prior Analytics, Chapter 46), see Fig. 1. He had an intuition
that quantifiers (both universal and existential ones) satisfy the semantic relations of
the square, too:
An affirmation is opposed to a denial in the sense which I denote by the term
‘contradictory’, when, while the subject remains the same, the affirmation is of
universal character and the denial is not. The affirmation ‘every man is white’ is
the contradictory of the denial ‘not every man is white’, or again, the proposition
‘noman is white’ is the contradictory of the proposition ‘somemen are white’. But
propositions are opposed as contraries when both the affirmation and the denial
are universal, as in the sentences ‘every man is white’, ‘no man is white’, ‘every
man is just’, ‘no man is just’ (On Interpretation, 7, 17 b 16 - 17 b 22).
However, for the first time, Apuleius explicitly claimed that quantified proposi-
tions satisfy the square. He wrote a short book, the Peri Hermeneias (Apuleius 1987),
about logic that was used for centuries in teaching. This book is the most famous in
the history of logic for including the first appearance of the square of opposition, the
best known logical schema for the pedagogic purpose (Apuleius 1987). He consid-
ered the four oppositions: contrary, subcontrary, contradictory, subalternation. First,
he described that the two incongruae (contrary) propositions, on the left and right
sides of the top of the square, never can be true at the same time and nonetheless are
sometimes false at the same time. For example, when some pleasures are good, both
universal propositions are false at the same time, since it is impossible that every
S is P S is not-P
S isn’t not-P S is not P
Fig. 1 Aristotle’s square of
opposition
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pleasure is both a good and not a good. The two propositions along the bottom line
(i.e., the mirror-image of the contrary) are called subpares (subcontrary). They are
never false at the same time, but they can be true at the same time. Hence, to confirm
that some pleasure is a good we cannot use an argument that some other pleasure is
not a good. Further, we pair together the alterutrae (contradictory) propositions, if we
add a negation to each of the pair of alternates, e.g., not every pleasure is a good
means that some pleasure is not a good. Finally, the subalternation appears between
universal and particular propositions, when the universal implies the particular, e.g., if
every pleasure is a good, then some pleasure is a good.
The meaning of propositions that satisfy the square of opposition can be checked
on Venn diagrams. Recall that a Venn diagram is an ellipse that designates an extent
of a concept A, i.e., a class of all real things that are denoted by A. These things are
called denotations. By assumption, all inner points of ellipse designate appropriate
real things. For instance, ‘every man is mortal’ is a true proposition, because the Venn
diagram of ‘man’ is included into the Venn diagram of ‘the mortal being’ (i.e., all
denotations of ‘man’ occur among denotations of ‘the mortal being’).
Kant first noted that there exists a true universal proposition like ‘all bodies are
heavy’ such that Venn diagrams of its subject and predicate do not assume the
including relation. So, the Venn diagram of ‘body’ just intersects the Venn diagram
of ‘heavy’:
In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought . . .
, this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate to the
subject A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or
outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it. In the
one case I entitle the judgment analytic, in the other synthetic. Analytic judg-
ments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate
with the subject is thought through identity; those in which this connection is
thought without identity should be entitled synthetic (. . . ) If I say, for instance,
‘All bodies are extended ’, this is an analytic judgment. For I do not require to
go beyond the concept which I connect with ‘body’ in order to find extension as
bound up with it . . . The judgment is therefore analytic. But when I say, ‘All
bodies are heavy’, the predicate is something quite different from anything that
I think in the mere concept of body in general; and the addition of such a
predicate therefore yields a synthetic judgment.
Judgments of experience, as such, are one and all synthetic. For it would be
absurd to found an analytic judgment on experience. Since, in framing the
judgment, I must not go outside my concept, there is no need to appeal to the
testimony of experience in its support (Kant 1999, B 10-11).
Thus, in Kant’s opinion, only analytic judgments satisfy the square of opposition
immediately. For synthetic judgments Venn diagrams lose a direct sense and, as a
result, we cannot apply the square for them mechanically. We need the transcendental
unity of apperception, the ability of my mind to be itself and synthesize all empirical
data within general statements. Hence, in order to avoid problems with synthetic
judgements, Kant proposed a version of meaningful logic, transcendental logic.
Nevertheless, it would be a much simpler way to build up a new formal logic, where
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the analytic statement ‘S is P ’ is translated as S ⇒ P and the synthetic statement ‘S is
P’ is translated as S&P.
Heinrich Rickert (1913) first suspected that on the basis of Kant’s synthetic
judgements we can construct a novel logic. In Aristotelian logic there is the inverse
relation between content (class of all connotations) and extent (class of all denota-
tions) of a concept. By continuing the Kant’s ideas, Heinrich Rickert claimed that for
synthetic judgments (propositions) there is the direct relation between content and
extent of a concept (proposition 3). Therefore we cannot use Venn diagrams there at
all.
Thus, according to Kant and Rickert, there are two logics (the Aristotelian for
analytic propositions, where we can use Venn diagrams and the square of opposition,
and the non-Aristotelian for synthetic propositions without Venn diagrams manipu-
lations). This distinction entails another distinction (proposed first by Wilhelm
Windelband and Heinrich Rickert) between two kinds of sciences: natural sciences
(Naturwissenschaften) and cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). In the first the
Aristotelian logic is used by applying a nomothetic approach, in the second the non-
Aristotelian by applying an idiographic approach. The idiographic approach is
concerned with individual phenomena, as in biography and much of history, while
its opposite, the nomothetic approach, aims to formulate laws as general propositions.
In history as in an individualizing science (eine individualisierende Wissenschaft)
we obtain the direct relation between content and extent of historical concepts: the
more general historical concept is more value relevant at the same time:
Die Einordnung eines historischen Objektes als eines Gliedes in einen “allge-
meinen” historischen Zusammenhang ist lediglich die Einordnung eines Indi-
viduums in ein anderes, umfassenderes Individuum, und dass dies ein Prozess
ist, der noch garnichts mit der Unterordnung unter einen allgemeinen Begriff zu
thun hat, kann nur von jemandem bezweifelt werden, der nicht gelernt hat, den
allgemeinen Inhalt eines Begriffes von seinem allgemeinen Umfang zu unter-
scheiden (Rickert 1899, p. 395).
The classification of a historical object as a member in a “general” historical
context is only a classification of an individuum within another, more complete
indviduum, and the fact that this is a process that has nothing to do with the
subordination under a general concept, can be doubted only by someone who has
not learned how to distinguish the general content of a concept from its general scope.
Under these conditions, the general does not imply the particular. For instance, as
we saw, we cannot distinguish the universal proposition ‘all bodies are heavy’ from
the particular one ‘some bodies are heavy’ by Venn diagrams, because the extents of
their concepts (the extents of ‘bodies’ and ‘heavy’) are just intersected.
Rickert did not think of creating a new square of opposition that may become
suitable for describing semantic oppositions between synthetic (historical, individu-
alizing) propositions. If we set up such a problem, we will start in distinguishing
between general and particular synthetic propositions.
For analytic propositions, while we move from the general (i.e., the concept with
the larger extent and the smaller content) to the particular (i.e., the concept with the
smaller extent and the larger content), we are losing definiteness and certainty. For
synthetic propositions, the general and the particular are two different points of view,
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because both have different extents and different contents with the same certainty,
which satisfy a direct relation between them (proposition 3).
In the Apuleian square of opposition there is a duality between the general and the
particular. Indeed, for the general there is a contrary negation and for the particular a
subcontrary negation, thereby the contrary negation tends to be maximized and the
subcontrary negation tends to be minimized. In the new square of opposition (see
Fig. 2) we could propose another duality that takes place between the affirmation and
the negation. In this case the contrary negation holds between the general affirmative
proposition and the particular affirmative proposition and the subcontrary negation
between the general negative proposition and the particular negative proposition.
In next sections we are formally proving that there exist two squares of opposition
and, correspondingly, two syllogistics (the first for analytic propositions and the
second for synthetic propositions).
3 Leśniewski’s Ontology
Leśniewski’s ontology (Leśniewski 1930; Leśniewski 1927–1931, 1930; Slupecki
1953) is based on propositional logic that is built in the standard way. We shall use
axioms of Lukasiewicz’s propositional calculus SPL as the input set of provable
propositions (Lukasiewicz 1957):
p ) qð Þ ) q ) rð Þ ) p ) rð Þð Þ; ð1Þ
:p ) pð Þ ) p; ð2Þ
p ) :p ) qð Þ: ð3Þ
The implication and complement are given there as basic operations. Other
operations are derivable, e.g., the conjunction and disjunction are defined as follows:
p ^ q :¼ : p ) :qð Þ; ð4Þ
I permit to doI order to do
I do not permit to do I do not order to do
Fig. 2 An example of the
square of opposition for
individualizing propositions
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p _ q :¼ :p ) q; ð5Þ
p  q :¼ p ) qð Þ ^ q ) pð Þ: ð6Þ
By combining axioms (1) - (3) and using inference rules, we could obtain all other
provable propositions for the system SPL.
Leśniewski’s ontology is an extension of propositional logic.
Definition 4 The alphabet of Leśniewski’s ontology is the ordered system ALO 0
〈V, Q, L1, L2, L3, L4, K〉, where
1. V is the set of propositional variables p, q, r, . . . ;
2. Q is the set of ontological variables A, B, C, . . . ;
3. L1 is the set of unary propositional connectives consisting of one element ¬
called the symbol of negation;
4. L2 is the set of binary propositional connectives containing three elements: ∧,
∨, ⇒ called the symbols of conjunction, disjunction, and implication
respectively;
5. L3 is the set of binary ontological connectives containing the only element ε
called the functor ". . . is. . . ";
6. L4 is the set consisting of two quantifiers: existential (∃) and universal (∀);
7. K is the set of auxiliary symbols containing two brackets: (, ). The sets V and
Q are denumerable.
Definition 5 The language of Leśniewski’s ontology is the ordered system LLO 0
〈ALO , FLO 〉, where
1. ALO is the alphabet of Leśniewski’s ontology;
2. FLO is the set of all formulas formed by means of symbols in ALO ; this set
FLO contains all well-formed propositional formulas and by the following
rules:
(a) every propositional variable p, q, r, . . . is a formula of Leśniewski’s
ontology;
(b) if A and B are ontological variables, then an expression AεB is a formula
of Leśniewski’s ontology;
(c) if α is a formula of Leśniewski’s ontology, where there is a free ontolog-
ical variable A, then QAα, where Q ∈ L4, is a formula of Leśniewski’s
ontology too;
(d) if α, β are formulas of Leśniewski’s ontology, then expressions ¬α, α∧β,
α∨β, α⇒β are formulas of Leśniewski’s ontology too;
(e) a finite sequence of symbols of ALO is called a formula of propositional
logic if that sequence satisfies above mentioned conditions.
Thus, an expression that is derivable by rules of definition 5 is called a formula of
Leśniewski’s ontology. Formulas that do not contain propositional variables are
called formulas of Leśniewski’s ontology in the restricted sense.
Definition 6 Leśniewski’s ontology is the ordered system SLO 0 〈ALO, FLO, C〉,
where
1. ALO is the alphabet of Leśniewski’s ontology;
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2. FLO is the set of all formulas formed by means of symbols in ALO;
3. C is the inference operation in FLO.
The inference rules of Leśniewski’s ontology are as follows:
1. the substitution rule: we replace a propositional variable pj of formula α(p1, . . . ,
pn), containing propositional variables p1, . . . , pn, by a formula β(q1, . . . , qk),
containing propositional variables q1, . . . , qk (resp. by a formula β(Al, Bm),
containing ontological variables Al, Bm), and we obtain a new propositional
formula α′(p1, . . . , pj−1, β(q1, . . . , qk), pj+1, . . . , pn) (resp. a new ontological
formula α′(p1, . . . , pj−1, β(Al, Bm), pj+1, . . . , pn)):
a p1; :::; pj; :::; pn
 
a0 p1; . . . ; pj1; b q1; . . . ; qkð Þ; pjþ1; . . . ; pn
 
or
a p1; :::; pj; :::; pn
 
a0 p1; . . . ; pj1; b Al;Bmð Þ; pjþ1; . . . ; pn
  ;
In the same way, from an ontological formula α(Aj , Bi) we can infer a new
formula α′(Ak, Bi) or α
′(Aj , Bl) if we replace an ontological variable Aj by an










2. modus ponens: according to that if two formulas of Leśniewski’s ontology α and
α ⇒ β hold, then we deduce a formula β:
a; a ) b
b
:
3. the universal generalization: if an ontological formula α, where there is no free
variable A, implies an ontological formula β, where there is a free variable A,










5. the existential generalization: an ontological formula α is followed by ∃Aα:
a
9Aa ;
6. the existential restriction: from an ontological formula ∃Aα we deduce α, where




The axioms of Leśniewski’s ontology include axioms of propositional logic
(e.g., axioms (1), (2), (3) of the propositional system SPL), and the following
expression:
A"B  9C C"Að Þ ^ 8C8D C"A ^ D"Að Þ ) C"Dð Þ ^ 8C C"A ) C"Bð Þð Þ; ð7Þ
where the expression AεB is read “A is B” and we are defining three properties of the
connective “. . . is. . . ”: (i) subject (A) is not empty, i.e., ∃C(CεA), (ii) subject (A) is a
singleton (consists of the only member), i.e., 8C8D C"A ^ D"Að Þ ) C"Dð Þ , (iii)
any member of subject (of A) belongs to predicate (B) as well, i.e., ∀C(CεA⇒CεB).
The third property (transitivity) means that if we have a proposition AεB and a
predicate B has another predicate X, then this X is a predicate of a subject A, too.
There is ever a predicate of predicate. In fact, the third property says that the predicate
is a genus for the subject. This is the main property of analytic propositions (for more
details see two previous sections).
3.1 Aristotelian Syllogistics as a Part of Non-empty Leśniewski’s Ontology
Let us extend Leśniewski’s ontology by adding the new axiom:
9C C"Að Þ: ð8Þ
The deductive system (1) - (8) is called non-empty Leśniewski’s ontology.
Aristotle offered the first formal theory called syllogistics, where there are four
logical connectives: a (“every + noun 1 + is + noun 2”), i (“some + noun 1 + is +
noun 2”), e (“no + noun 1 + is + noun 2”) and o (“some + noun 1 + is not + noun 2”).
The axiomatic system of Aristotelian syllogistics was created first by Lukasiewicz
(Lukasiewicz 1957). His axioms are as follows:
SaS; ð9Þ
SiS; ð10Þ
MaP ^ SaMð Þ ) SaP; i:e:;Barbara; ð11Þ
MaP ^M iSð Þ ) SiP; i:e:;Datisi: ð12Þ
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The functors a and i are basic, and two others are defined as follows:
SeP :¼ : SiPð Þ; ð13Þ
SoP :¼ : SaPð Þ: ð14Þ
By using axioms (1), (2), (3), (9), (10), (11), (12), and definitions (4), (5), (6), (13),
(14), we may obtain all tautologies of Aristotle’s syllogistics.
Proposition 5 Aristotelian syllogistics is contained in non-empty Leśniewski’s ontol-
ogy (see Slupecki 1953).
Proof Wecould define atomic propositions ofAristotelian syllogistics in the followingway:
SaP :¼ 9A A"Sð Þ ^ 8A A"S ) A"Pð Þð Þ; ð15Þ
SiP :¼ 9A A"S ^ A"Pð Þ; ð16Þ
SeP :¼ : SiPð Þ; ð17Þ
SoP :¼ : SaPð Þ: ð18Þ
Further, we may show that axioms (9) - (12) are provable in Leśniewski’s
ontology. For example, check the case of (9). From the propositional tautology p ⇒
p we can deduce (AεS) ⇒ (AεS) by substitution rule. Then we obtain ∀A((AεS) ⇒
(AεS)) by universal generalization. On the other hand, the proposition ∃A(AεS)
follows from (8). Hence, we have proved SaS.
In non-empty Leśniewski’s ontology, the so-called square of opposition holds (see
Fig. 3). Namely, the following propositions are theorems: SaP ⇒ ¬(SoP), ¬(SoP) ⇒
SaP , SiP ⇒ ¬(SeP), ¬(SeP) ⇒ SiP, SeP ⇒ ¬(SiP), ¬(SiP) ⇒ SeP , SoP ⇒ ¬(SaP), ¬
(SaP) ⇒ SoP , SaP ⇒ ¬(SeP), SeP ⇒ ¬(SaP), ¬(SiP) ⇒ SoP , ¬(SoP) ⇒ SiP , SaP ⇒ SiP ,




Fig. 3 The square of opposition
in Aristotelian syllogistics
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3.2 Vasil’év’s Syllogistics as a Part of Non-empty Leśniewski’s Ontology
The Russian logician Nikolai Vasil’év (1880 - 1940) proposed another syllogistic
system (Vasil’év 1910, 1912), where instead of two particular propositions of
Aristotelian syllogistics (SiP and SoP) we have only one (SmP) that is read so:
“some, but not all S is P ”. This logic with SmP is called Vasil’ev’s logic of concepts.
He presented it in 1910 without giving a syllogistic system. As W. Suchon proved
later, in the logic of concepts only six moods are valid (Suchon 1998, 1999).
Vasil’év’s syllogistics has the following axioms (Schumann 2006):
SaS; ð19Þ
MaP ^ SaMð Þ ) SaP; ð20Þ
MeP ^ SaMð Þ ) SeP; ð21Þ
MmP ^MaSð Þ ) SmP; ð22Þ
SeP ) PeS; ð23Þ
SaP ) : SePð Þ; ð24Þ
SmP ) : SaPð Þ ^ : SePð Þð Þ; ð25Þ
: SaPð Þ ^ : SePð Þð Þ ) SmP: ð26Þ
Proposition 6 Vasil’év’s syllogistics is contained in non-empty Leśniewski’s ontology.
Proof Atomic propositions of Vasil’év’s syllogistics can be defined as follows:
SaP :¼ 9A A"Sð Þ ^ 8A A"S ) A"Pð Þð Þ; ð27Þ
SeP :¼ :9A A"S ^ A"Pð Þ; ð28Þ
SmP :¼ 9A A"S ^ A"Pð Þ ^ 8A: A"Sð Þ _ 9A A"S ^ : A"Pð Þð Þð Þð Þð Þ: ð29Þ
As a result, axioms (19) - (26) are provable in non-empty Leśniewski’s ontology.
In non-empty Leśniewski’s ontology, Vasil’év’s triangle of opposition holds (see
Fig. 4), i.e., the following propositions are provable: SaP ∨SeP ∨SmP , ¬(SaP ∧ SeP),
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¬(SaP ∧ SmP), ¬(SeP ∧ SmP). Notice that the fact that Vasil’ev’s logic of concepts is
a part of Leśniewski’s non-empty ontology confirms that Leśniewski’s ontology is a
general theory of propositions of the form ‘S is P ’ indeed.
4 Synthetic Ontology
Let us notice that in non-empty Leśniewski’s ontology (this means, in Aristotle’s
syllogistics and in Vasil’év’s syllogistics as well) analytic propositions in Kant’s
words are formalized, i.e., we assume that if AεB is true, then ∀C(CεA ⇒ CεB)) is
true (then the predicate is a genus for the subject).
In such propositions, a subject is thought within a predicate, the more common
concept, for example: “Socrates is a man” or “All people are animals”. Therefore the
predicate in formulas SεP , SaP , SiP , SeP , SoP , SmP may be replaced by nouns, but
not by adjectives. In other words, we have the following grammar: “noun 1 (subject)
+ is + noun 2 (predicate)”, and the concept of “noun 1” is a kind (particular) of the
concept of “noun 2”, i.e. “noun 2” is thought as general for “noun 1”.
However, how far can we consider propositions like “Socrates is white”, “All
bodies are heavy” within a conventional syllogistics formalizing just analytic prop-
ositions? At the first blush, these troubles might be avoided if we transformed an
appropriate adjective into a noun. For example, the proposition “Socrates is white”
may be converted to the proposition “Socrates is a white being”, and “All bodies are
heavy” to “All bodies are something heavy”. However, such a transformation does
not solve our problem, because the predicate is still not general for the subject. Thus,
Socrates’ whiteness is not his substantial attribute, and the general of bodies is space,
but not weight. Any body is thought first as a space entity.
Aristotle first noticed that there are propositions that, since Kant, have been
called synthetic, and these propositions cannot be used in syllogistics.
Aristotle’s counterexample was as follows: “He who sits, writes, and Socrates
is sitting, then Socrates is writing” (Topics VIII, 10, 160 b 26 ff). This wrong
syllogism was caused by using synthetic propositions. Kant’s key example of
synthetic propositions: “All bodies are heavy”. They have the following grammar:
“noun 1 (subject) + is + adjective (attribute)”.
Fig. 4 The triangle of opposi-
tion in Vasil’év’s syllogistics
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It is possible to show a distinction of attributive (synthetic) and predicative
(analytic) propositions in the following way:
1. “an attributive adjective + a common noun” (for example, ‘the good president’),
2. “a predicative adjective + a common noun” (for example, ‘the American
president’).
Hence, ‘the American president’ means a word-combination of both ‘American’
and ‘president’, whereas ‘the good president’ does not mean a word-combination of
‘good’ and ‘president’. In other words, using the substitution rule for predicative
adjectives, we can always construct the following valid outputs:
& “All soldiers are motorists; therefore all Russian soldiers are Russian motorists”,
& “All soldiers are motorists; therefore all soldier–vegetarians are motorist–
vegetarians”.
At the same time, using the substitution rule for attributive adjectives, we receive
outputs which are not valid:
& “All soldiers are motorists; therefore all well-skilled soldiers are well-skilled
motorists”,
& “All soldiers are motorists; therefore all former soldiers are former motorists”.
Let us try to answer if it is possible to construct a clone of Leśniewski’s ontology
(Aristotle’s syllogistics and Vasil’év’s syllogistics as well) for synthetic propositions.
The novel ontology is said to be synthetic (the new syllogistics are said to be
synthetic too). It is built up by adding the following new axiom to axioms (1) - (3):
AistB  9C CistAð Þ ^ 8C8D CistA ^ DistAð Þ ) CistDð Þ ^ 8C CistA ^ CistBð Þð Þ;
ð30Þ
The formula AistB designates any synthetic propositions. Let us compare formula
(30) with (7). We see that instead of the property that the predicate is a genus of the
subject, we have the property that the subject has ever a non-empty intersection with
the predicate.
Inference rules in synthetic ontology are the same as in Leśniewski’s ontology.
Non-empty synthetic ontology is obtained by adding the new axiom
9C CistAð Þ: ð31Þ
Proposition 7 All theorems of (non-empty) Leśniewski’s ontology are theorems of
(non-empty) synthetic ontology as well.
Proof We can show that axiom (7) is a theorem of (non-empty) synthetic ontology.
Indeed, the following proposition holds there:
‘ ðAistB  9C CistAð Þ ^ 8C8Dð CistA ^ DistAð Þ ) CistDð Þ^
^8C CistA ^ CistBð ÞÞÞ ) ðAistB  ð9C CistAð Þ^
^8C8D CistA ^ DistAð Þ ) CistDÞ ^ 8C CistA ) CistBð Þð ÞÞ
Then from this proposition and axiom (30) we deduce axiom (7) by modus ponens.
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The syllogistic synthetic propositions are understood in this paper as follows:
& Affirmative synthetic a priori : ‘All S are P ’ (“All bodies are heavy”): there exist
A such that AistS and for any A, AistS and AistP;
& Affirmative synthetic a posteriori: ‘Some S are P’ (“Socrates is white”): for any A,
both AistS is false and AistP is false;
& Negative synthetic a priori: ‘No S are P ’ (“No bodies are angels”): there exist A
such that AistS or AistP;
& Negative synthetic a posteriori : ‘Some S are not P ’ (“Socrates is not black”): for
any A, AistS is false or there exist A such that AistS is false or AistP is false.
4.1 Syllogistics of Synthetic Propositions
Let us sketch now the syllogistic system formalizing synthetic propositions. This system
is said to be synthetic syllogistics, while we are assuming that Aristotelian syllogistics is
analytic. The basic logical connectives of synthetic syllogistics are as follows: a (“every +
noun + is + adjective”), i (“some + noun + is + adjective”), e (“no + noun + is +
adjective”) and o (“some + noun + is not + adjective”) that are defined in synthetic
ontology in the following way:
SaP :¼ 9A AistSð Þ ^ 8A AistS ^ AistPð Þð Þð Þ; ð32Þ
SiP :¼ 8A : AistSð Þ ^ : AistPð Þð Þ; ð33Þ
SoP :¼ : 9A AistSð Þ ^ 8A AistS ^ AistPð Þð Þð Þ;
i:e: 8A: AistSð Þ _ 9A : AistSð Þ _ : AistPð Þð Þð Þ; ð34Þ
SeP :¼ :8A : AistSð Þ ^ : AistPð Þð Þ; i:e:9A AistS _ AistPð Þ: ð35Þ
Now let us formulate axioms of synthetic syllogistics:
SaP ) SeP; ð36Þ
SaP ) PaS; ð37Þ
SiP ) PiS; ð38Þ
SaM ) SeP; ð39Þ
M aP ) SeP; ð40Þ
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M aP ^ SaMð Þ ) SaP; ð41Þ
M iP ^ SiMð Þ ) SiP: ð42Þ
Proposition 8 Synthetic syllogistics is a deductive part of non-empty synthetic
ontology.
Proof By using expressions (32) - (35), we can prove that axioms of synthetic
syllogistics (36) - (42) are theorems of non-empty synthetic ontology.
In non-empty synthetic ontology we have a novel square of opposition that we call
the synthetic square of opposition (see Fig. 5), where the following theorems are
inferred: SaP ⇒ ¬(SoP), ¬(SoP) ⇒ SaP, SiP⇒¬(SeP ), ¬(SeP ) ⇒ SiP , SeP ⇒ ¬(SiP ), ¬
(SiP) ⇒ SeP , SoP ⇒ ¬(SaP ), ¬(SaP ) ⇒ SoP, SaP ⇒ ¬(SiP ), SiP ⇒ ¬(SaP), ¬(SeP ) ⇒
SoP , ¬(SoP) ⇒ SeP , SaP ⇒ SeP , SiP ⇒ SoP, SeP ∨ SiP, ¬(SeP ∧ SiP), SaP ∨ SoP, ¬
(SaP ∧ SoP), ¬(SaP ∧ SiP), SeP ∨ SoP.
4.2 Synthetic Syllogistics of Vasil’év’s Type
Let us construct syllogistics of Vasil’év’s type for synthetic propositions. Its main
logical connectives are derivable in synthetic ontology by means of the following
definitions:
SaP :¼ 9A AistSð Þ ^ 8A AistS ^ AistPð Þð Þð Þ; ð43Þ
SiP :¼ 8A : AistSð Þ ^ : AistPð Þð Þ; ð44Þ





Fig. 5 The synthetic square of
opposition (for synthetic syllo-
gistics, where synthetic proposi-
tions are formalized)
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Axioms are as follows:
SaP ) SeP; ð46Þ
SaP ) PaS; ð47Þ
SiP ) PiS; ð48Þ
M aP ^ SaMð Þ ) SaP; ð49Þ
M iP ^ SiMð Þ ) SiP: ð50Þ
SmP ) : SaPð Þ ^ : SiPð Þð Þ; ð51Þ
: SaPð Þ ^ : SiPð Þð Þ ) SmP: ð52Þ
Proposition 9 Synthetic syllogistics of Vasil’év’s type is deduced in non-empty
synthetic ontology.
Proof By using expressions (43) - (45), we can prove that axioms of synthetic
syllogistics of Vasil’év’s type (46) - (52) become theorems of non-empty synthetic
ontology.
In synthetic ontology we can build the synthetic triangle of opposition (see Fig. 6),
where we are picturing the following theorems: SaP ∨ SiP ∨ SmP , ¬(SaP ∧ SiP ), ¬
(SaP ∧ SmP ), ¬(SiP ∧ SmP ).
5 Non-Archimedean Models of Aristotelian Syllogistics, Vasil’év’s Syllogistics,
Synthetic Syllogistics, and Synthetic Syllogistics of Vasil’év’s Type
Suppose B is a complete Boolean algebra with the bottom element 0 and the top
element 1 such that the cardinality of its domain |B| is an infinite number. Build up the
set BB of all functions f : B→B. The set of all complements for finite subsets of B is a
filter and it is called a Frechét filter, it is denoted by U . Further, define a new
relation≈on the set BB by f≈g 0 {a ∈ B: f(a) 0 g(a)} ∈ U. It is easily proved that the
relation≈ is an equivalence. For each f ∈ BB let [f] denote the equivalence class of f
under ≈. The ultrapower BB /U is then defined to be the set of all equivalence classes
[f] as f ranges over BB . This ultrapower is called a nonstandard (or non-
Archimedean) extension of Boolean algebra B, for more details (Robinson 1966;
Schumann 2008). It is denoted by ∗B.
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There exist two groups of members of ∗B: (1) functions that are constant, e.g., f (a) 0
m ∈ B on the set U , a constant function [f 0 m] is denoted by ∗m, (2) functions that
are not constant. The set of all constant functions of ∗B is called standard set and it is
denoted by ◦B. The members of ◦B are called standard. It is readily seen that B and ◦B
are isomorphic.
We can extend the usual partial order structure onB to a partial order structure on ◦B:
1. for any members x, y ∈ B we have x≤y in B iff ∗x≤∗y in ◦B,
2. each member ∗x ∈ ◦B\{∗0} (i.e. that is not a bottom element ∗0 of ◦B) is greater
than any number [f] ∈ ∗B\◦B, i.e. ∗x>[f] for any x ∈ B, where [f] is not constant
function,
3. ∗0 is the bottom element of ∗B.
Notice that under these conditions, there exist the top element ∗1 ∈ ∗B such that 1 ∈
B and the bottom element ∗0 ∈ ∗B such that 0 ∈ B.
The ordering conditions mentioned above have the following informal sense: (1)
the sets ◦B and B have isomorphic order structure; (2) the set ∗B\{∗0} contains actual
infinities that are less than any member of ◦B\{∗0}. These members are called
Boolean infinitesimals.
Introduce three operations ‘sup’, ‘inf’, ‘¬’ in the partial order structure of ∗B:
inf f½ ; g½ ð Þ ¼ inf f ; gð Þ½ ;
sup f½ ; g½ ð Þ ¼ sup f ; gð Þ½ ;
: f½  ¼ :f½ :
This means that a nonstandard extension ∗B of a Boolean algebra B preserves the
least upper bound ‘sup’, the greatest lower bound ‘inf’, and the complement ‘¬’ of B.
Consider the member [h] of ∗B such that {a ∈ B : h(a)≤f (¬a) or h(a)>f (¬a)} ∈ U .
Denote [h] by [f¬]. Then we see that inf([f], [f¬])≥∗0 and sup([f], [f¬])≤∗1. Really, we
have several cases.
1. Case 1. The members ¬[f] and [f¬] are incompatible. Then inf ([f], [f¬])≥∗0 and
sup([f], [f¬])≤∗1,
2. Case 2. Suppose ¬[f]≥[f¬]. In this case inf([f], [f¬]) 0 ∗0 and sup([f], [f¬])≤∗1.
Fig. 6 The synthetic triangle of
opposition
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3. Case 3. Suppose ¬[f]≤[f¬]. In this case inf([f], [f¬])≥∗0 and sup([f], [f¬]) 0 ∗1.
4. Case 4. The members [f] and ¬[f¬] are incompatible. Then inf(¬[f], ¬[f¬])≥∗0
and sup(¬[f], ¬[f¬])≤∗1,
5. Case 5. Suppose ¬[f¬]≥[f]. In this case inf(¬[f], ¬[f¬])≥∗0 and sup(¬[f], ¬[f¬]) 0
∗1.
6. Case 6. Suppose ¬[f¬]≤[f]. In this case inf(¬[f], ¬[f¬]) 0 ∗0 and sup(¬[f],
¬[f¬])≤∗1.
7. Case 7. The members ¬[f¬] and ¬[f] are incompatible. Then inf([f], ¬[f¬])≥∗0
and sup([f], ¬[f¬])≤∗1,
8. Case 8. Suppose ¬[f]≥¬[f¬]. In this case inf([f], ¬[f¬]) 0 ∗0 and sup([f],
¬[f¬])≤∗1.
9. Case 9. Suppose ¬[f]≤¬[f¬]. In this case inf([f], ¬[f¬])≥∗0 and sup([f], ¬[f¬]) 0
∗1.
10. Case 10. The members [f] and [f¬] are incompatible. Then inf(¬[f], [f¬])≥∗0 and
sup(¬[f], [f¬])≤∗1,
11. Case 11. Suppose [f¬]≥[f]. In this case inf(¬[f], [f¬])≥∗0 and sup(¬[f], [f¬]) 0 ∗1.
12. Case 12. Suppose [f¬]≤[f]. In this case inf(¬[f], [f¬]) 0 ∗0 and sup(¬[f],
[f¬])≤∗1.
Definition 7 Now define hyperrational valued matrix logic MB as the ordered
system 〈∗B, {∗1}, ¬, ⇒, ∨, ∧〉, where
1. ∗B is the set of truth values,
2. {∗1} is the set of designated truth values,
3. for all [x] ∈ ∗B, ¬[x] 0 ∗1−[x],
4. for all [x], [y] ∈ ∗B, [x]⇒[y] 0 ∗1−sup([x], [y])+[y],
5. for all [x], [y] ∈ ∗B, [x] ∧ [y] 0 inf([x], [y]),
6. for all [x], [y] ∈ ∗B, [x] ∨ [y] 0 sup([x], [y]).
Proposition 10 In MB there are only two squares of opposition.
Proof We have just eight cases: (1) [f]≤[f¬], (2) [f]≤¬[f¬], (3) [f¬]≤[f], (4) [f¬]≤¬[f],
(5) ¬[f¬]≤[f], (6) ¬[f¬]≤¬[f], (7) ¬[f]≤[f¬], (8) ¬[f]≤¬[f¬]. Taking into account that
couples [f] and ¬[f] ([f¬] and ¬[f¬]) are contradictory, we can claim that there exist
two squares of opposition:
& if [f]≤¬[f¬] (resp. [f¬]≤¬[f]), we have the conventional square of opposition (see
Fig. 7); if ¬[f¬]≤[f] (resp. ¬[f]≤[f¬]), we have its dual without changing meaning.
& if [f¬]≤[f] (resp. ¬[f]≤¬[f¬]), we have the synthetic square of opposition; if
[f]≤[f¬] (resp. ¬[f¬]≤¬[f]), we have its dual without changing meaning (see
Fig. 8);
Corollary 1 In MB there are only two triangles of opposition.
Proof & if [f]≤¬[f¬] (resp. [f¬]≤¬[f]), we may define the new connective ¬[f¬] ∧
¬[f] and then obtain the conventional triangle of opposition (see Fig. 9); if
¬[f¬]≤[f] (resp. ¬[f]≤[f¬]), we should define the new connective as fol-
lows: [f] ∧ [f¬], in order to have its dual without changing meaning;
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& if [f¬]≤[f] (resp. ¬[f]≤¬[f¬]), we introduce the new connective [f] ∧ ¬[f¬] and then
obtain the synthetic triangle of opposition; if [f]≤[f¬] (resp. ¬[f¬]≤¬[f]), we define
[f¬] ∧ ¬[f] to have its dual without changing meaning (see Fig. 10).
Now we can build models for atomic syllogistic formulas (i.e., syllogistic formulas
without propositional connectives) due to algebra MB .
Definition 8 A structure B 0 〈O, I, 〉 is a
non-Archimedean syllogistic model iff:
1. O is a restriction of the set MB to an appropriate square (triangle) of
opposition (thereby the conventional square of opposition should hold true
for Aristotelian syllogistics, the conventional triangle of opposition holds for
Vasil’év’s syllogistics, the synthetic square of opposition holds for synthetic
syllogistics, and the synthetic triangle of opposition holds for synthetic
syllogistics of Vasil’év’s type).
2. I is a mapping that associates a class of equivalence [f] ∈ O with each atomic
syllogistic formula S ⋄ P , where ,
so that , where
[f ] [ f ] 
[f ] [f ] 
¬
¬¬¬
Fig. 7 In case [f¬] ≤ ¬[f], the
square of oppositions for any
members [f], [f¬], ¬[f], ¬[f¬] of
*B holds true, i.e. [f], [f¬] are
contrary, [f], ¬[f] (resp. ¬[f¬],
[f¬]) are contradictory, ¬[f¬], ¬[f]
are subcontrary, [f], ¬[f¬] (resp.
[f¬], ¬[f]) are said to stand in the
subalternation
[f ] [f ] 




Fig. 8 In case ¬[f¬] ≤ ¬[f], the
synthetic square of oppositions
for any members [f], [f¬], ¬[f],
¬[f¬] of ∗B holds true, i.e. [f],
¬[f¬] are contrary, [f], ¬[f] (resp.
¬[f¬], [f¬]) are contradictory,
¬[f], [f¬] are subcontrary, [f], [f¬]
(resp. ¬[f¬], ¬[f]) are said to
stand in the subalternation
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and
& Sj j a Pj j ¼ f½  resp: Sj j a Pj j ¼ : f :½ 
 
;
& Sj j e Pj j ¼ f :½  resp: Sj j e Pj j ¼ : f½ 

;
& Sj j i Pj j ¼ : f :½  resp: Sj j i Pj j ¼ f½ 

;
& Sj j o Pj j ¼ : fj j resp: Sj j o Pj j ¼ f :½ 
 
;








We now give the truth conditions of Boolean combinations of atomic syllogistic
formulas in a non-Archimedean syllogistic model:
Definition 9
Proposition 11 Syllogistic formula ϕ is valid in B if it is provable in nonempty
Leśniewski’s ontology or in non-empty synthetic ontology.
Fig. 9 The triangle of
opposition




In this paper we have shown that we can introduce the novel ontology of
Leśniewski’s type to differentiate synthetic propositions that we may describe within
this new ontology from analytic propositions that are described in conventional
syllogistic systems. We have claimed that the absolutely novel square (triangle) of
opposition holds for synthetic propositions. This statement is supported by argument
that in non-Archimedean extension of Boolean algebra there are just two squares
(triangles) of opposition.
Proposition 10 states that there are only two squares of opposition if we assume
Boolean algebra as the basis of an appropriate non-Archimedean extension. The
conventional square of opposition may be aimed for getting analytic syllogistics
(Aristotelian syllogistics) and the new one for getting synthetic syllogistics (syllo-
gistics, proposed in this paper). Also, we can define a novel duality relation between
conjunction and disjunction, universal quantifier and existential quantifier, modal
operators of necessity and possibility and, as a result, we can build up absolutely new
first-order logic and modal logic.
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